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Information Bounds for State Estimation in the
Presence of an Eavesdropper
Alex S. Leong , Daniel E. Quevedo , Daniel Dolz , and Subhrakanti Dey
Abstract—Remote state estimation problems in the
presence of eavesdroppers have recently been investi-
gated in the literature. For unstable systems, it has been
shown that it is possible to keep the expected estimation
error covariance bounded, while the expected eavesdrop-
per error covariance becomes unbounded in the infinite
horizon. In this note, we consider an alternative notion of
security based on the amount of information revealed to the
eavesdropper. Upper and lower bounds on the information
revealed are derived. In particular, in the infinite horizon,
it is shown that with unstable systems, any transmis-
sion policy (within the class of stationary deterministic
policies where the sensor at each time step can either
transmit its local state estimate or not) which keeps the
expected estimation error covariance bounded must always
reveal a non-zero expected amount of information to the
eavesdropper.
Index Terms—Directed information, eavesdropping,
security, state estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the last decade, the amount of data transmit-ted wirelessly has increased dramatically, owing to the
popularity of 3G/4G smartphones, and other devices commu-
nicating via Wi-Fi and Bluetooth such as laptops and tablets.
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, other
agents in the vicinity can often overhear what is being trans-
mitted. It is therefore important to protect transmissions from
eavesdroppers, which has traditionally been achieved using
cryptography. However, due to 1) the often limited computa-
tional power available at the transmitters to implement strong
encryption, 2) the increased computational power available
to malicious agents, and 3) poorly implemented security in
some Internet of Things devices, achieving security using
solely cryptographic means may not necessarily be guaranteed.
Alternative and complementary ways to implement security
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using physical layer and information theoretic techniques have
thus received significant recent interest [1].
The term “physical layer security” refers to approaches to
implement security using physical layer characteristics of the
wireless channel such as fading, interference, and noise [2].
Using such ideas, estimation problems with eavesdroppers
have recently been studied, such as [3]–[6] for estimation
of constants or i.i.d. sources, and [7]–[11] for state estima-
tion of dynamical systems. The purpose is usually to keep the
mean squared error or estimation error covariance at the eaves-
dropper above a certain level. For dynamical systems, one of
the main results shown in the above works is that for the
case of unstable systems, it is possible to drive the expected
eavesdropper error covariance unbounded while keeping the
expected estimation error covariance at the legitimate remote
estimator (or receiver) bounded.
Mutual information is a measure of the additional
information gained by receiving a measurement. In the current
work, instead of considering the eavesdropper error covariance
as the measure of security as in [7]–[11], we instead study the
information revealed to the eavesdropper. In particular we con-
sider the sum of conditional mutual informations (also known
as the directed information [12]) revealed to the eavesdrop-
per. In addition to the wide use of mutual information in
information theoretic security measures, directed information
has also been justified as a measure of privacy/secrecy for
control applications in [13]: it is the unique measure satis-
fying a number of reasonable postulates, in particular that it
should satisfy a data processing inequality and that the total
information leakage has a stage-additive form. Other works in
control system design using the directed information measure
include [14], [15].
In the current work, a sensor makes noisy measurements of
a linear dynamical process. The sensor transmits local state
estimates to the remote estimator over a packet dropping link.
At the same time, an eavesdropper can successfully eaves-
drop on the sensor transmission with a certain probability, see
Fig. 1. A key feature of the current setup is that one can
decide at each instant whether the sensor should transmit or
not. Our results in this note show that the expected information
revealed to the eavesdropper is both upper and lower bounded.
In particular, the lower bound says that information leakage is
unavoidable for all such transmission policies which keep the
expected error covariance at the legitimate receiver bounded.
As numerical illustration of these results, we also compare
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Fig. 1. Remote State Estimation with an Eavesdropper.
our bounds with a transmission scheduling problem minimiz-
ing a linear combination of the expected error covariance and
expected information revealed.
Notation: Given a square matrix X, we let λmin(X) and
λmax(X) denote the minimum and maximum eigenvalues of
X respectively if they are real valued, and we use |λmax(X)| to
denote the spectral radius of X. We denote the largest singular
value of X by σmax(X).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A diagram of the system model is shown in Fig. 1. Consider
a discrete time process
xk+1 = Axk + wk (1)
where xk ∈ Rnx and wk is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and
covariance Q > 0.1 The sensor has measurements
yk = Cxk + vk, (2)
where yk ∈ Rny and vk is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean
and covariance R > 0. The noise processes {wk} and {vk}
are assumed to be mutually independent, and independent of
the initial state x0.
The sensor forms and transmits local state estimates
x̂sk|k [16] to the remote estimator. The local state estimates
and estimation error covariances
x̂sk|k  E[xk|y0, . . . , yk]
Psk|k  E[(xk − x̂sk|k)(xk − x̂sk|k)|y0, . . . , yk]
can be computed at the sensor using the standard Kalman
filtering equations, see, e.g., [17]. We will assume that the pair
(A, C) is observable and the pair (A, Q1/2) is controllable. Let
P̄ > 0 be the steady state value of Psk|k as k → ∞, which
exists due to the observability assumption. For simplicity of
presentation, we will assume that this local Kalman filter is
operating in the steady state regime, so that Psk|k = P̄,∀k. We
note that in general convergence to steady state occurs at an
exponential rate [17].
Let νk ∈ {0, 1} be decision variables such that νk = 1 if and
only if x̂sk|k is to be transmitted at time k. The decision vari-
ables νk are determined (following a stationary deterministic
policy) at the remote estimator, which is assumed to have more
computational capabilities than the sensor, using information
1For a symmetric matrix X, we say that X > 0 if it is positive definite, and
X ≥ 0 if it is positive semi-definite.
available at time k − 1, and then fed back to the sensor before
transmission at time k.2
When νk = 1, the sensor transmits over a packet dropping
channel to the remote estimator. Let γk ∈ {0, 1} be random
variables such that γk = 1 if and only if the sensor transmis-
sion at time k is successfully received by the remote estimator.
We will assume that {γk} is an i.i.d. Bernoulli process [19] with
P(γk = 1) = p ∈ [0, 1].
Sensor transmissions can be overheard by an eavesdropper
over another packet dropping channel. Let γe,k ∈ {0, 1} be
random variables such that γe,k = 1 if and only if the sensor
transmission at time k is overheard by the eavesdropper. The
process {γe,k} is i.i.d. Bernoulli with
P(γe,k = 1) = pe ∈ [0, 1].
We assume the processes {γk} and {γe,k} to be mutually
independent.
At times where νk = 1, it is assumed that the remote esti-
mator knows whether the transmission was successful or not,
with dropped packets discarded. Define the information set
available to the remote estimator at time k as:
Ik  {ν0, . . . , νk, ν0γ0, . . . , νkγk, ν0γ0x̂s0|0, . . . , νkγkx̂sk|k}.
For further reference, denote the state estimates and estimation
error covariances at the remote estimator by:
x̂k|k  E[xk|Ik],
Pk|k  E[(xk − x̂k|k)(xk − x̂k|k)|Ik]. (3)
Similarly, the eavesdropper knows if it has eavesdropped
sucessfully. Define the information set available to the eaves-
dropper at time k as:
Ie,k  {ν0, . . . , νk, ν0γe,0, . . . , νkγe,k,
ν0γe,0x̂
s
0|0, . . . , νkγe,kx̂
s
k|k},
and the state estimates and estimation error covariances at the
eavesdropper by:
x̂e,k|k  E[xk|Ie,k],
Pe,k|k  E[(xk − x̂e,k|k)(xk − x̂e,k|k)|Ie,k]. (4)
As previously mentioned, the decision variables νk are deter-
mined at the (legitimate) remote estimator and fed back to
the sensor. We will consider the case where νk depends on
both Pk−1|k−1 and Pe,k−1|k−1, as well as the case where νk
depends only on Pk−1|k−1 and the remote estimator’s belief of
Pe,k−1|k−1 constructed from knowledge of previous νk’s. We
denote by V the class of stationary deterministic scheduling
policies where the sensor at each time step can either transmit
its local estimate or not. The optimal remote estimator can be
shown to have the form
x̂k|k =
{
Ax̂k−1|k−1, νkγk = 0
x̂sk|k, νkγk = 1
Pk|k =
{
f (Pk−1|k−1), νkγk = 0
P̄, νkγk = 1, (5)
2The case of imperfect feedback links can also be handled by adapting
techniques used in [18, Sec. II-C].
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where
f (X)  AXA + Q. (6)
Simlarly, at the eavesdropper the optimal estimator satisfies:
x̂e,k|k =
{
Ax̂e,k−1|k−1, νkγe,k = 0
x̂sk|k, νkγe,k = 1
Pe,k|k =
{
f (Pe,k−1|k−1), νkγe,k = 0
P̄, νkγe,k = 1.
Define the countable set of matrices:
S  {P̄, f (P̄), f 2(P̄), . . . }, (7)
where f n(.) is the n-fold composition of f (.), with f 0(X) 
X. The set S consists of all possible values of Pk|k at the
remote estimator, as well as all possible values of Pe,k|k at the
eavesdropper. There is a total ordering (in the Loewner order)
on S given by (see, e.g., [20])
P̄ ≤ f (P̄) ≤ f 2(P̄) ≤ ... (8)
III. BOUNDS ON INFORMATION REVEALED TO
EAVESDROPPER
In this section we will show that the expected amount
of information revealed to an eavesdropper is both upper
and lower bounded. Optimal transmission scheduling prob-
lems, which minimize a linear combination of the expected
error covariance at the remote estimator and the expected
information revealed to the eavesdropper, will be considered
in Section IV.
Let ze,k  (νk, νkγe,k, νkγe,kx̂sk|k) be received by the eaves-
dropper at time k. The conditional mutual information
Ie,k  I(xk; ze,k|ze,0, . . . , ze,k−1)
between xk and ze,k has the expression (see [15], [21]):
Ie,k = 1
2





log det f (Pe,k−1|k−1) − 1
2
log det Pe,k|k (9)
We have the following preliminary result:











is decreasing in N ∈ N.
Proof: See Appendix A.
A. Upper Bound
We will first show (in Theorem 1) that the expected
information revealed to the eavesdropper is always upper
bounded, for any transmission policy in V and all pe. To
achieve this, we will use the following result:
Lemma 2: We have
g(N) ≤ 1
2
log det f (P̄) − 1
2
log det P̄  U < ∞
for all N ∈ N, where g(N) is defined in (10).
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 1.







E[Ie,k] < U < ∞,
where U is as given in Lemma 2.
Proof: For a given K, let the random variable τ(K) count
the number of times where γe,k = 1 for k ≤ K. Denote the (in
general random) durations between successful eavesdroppings





























where the first inequality comes from Lemma 2. As (11)





We will now focus on unstable systems, i.e., where the A
matrix in (1) satisfies |λmax(A)| > 1. For such systems, it
turns out that if one uses a transmission scheduling policy in
V which keeps the expected error covariance of the remote
estimator bounded, then unavoidably one will always reveal a
non-zero expected amount of information to the eavesdropper.
Before proving this result in Theorem 2, we will need the
following:
Lemma 3: Let A be an unstable matrix. Then we have
g(N) > log |λmax(A)|  L > 0
for all N ∈ N, where g(N) is defined in (10).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 2: Let A be an unstable matrix, and assume that















E[Ie,k] > pe log |λmax(A)|  ̃L > 0.
Proof: We first argue that for any transmission policy in V
satisfying (12), the time between any two successive transmis-
sion attempts must be upper bounded by some constant κmax,
where κmax depends on the particular policy used. Consider
the Markov chain induced by a particular stationary deter-
ministic policy satisfying (12). Suppose by contradiction that
there exists a state in this Markov chain such that once
this state is visited, there will then be an unbounded num-
ber of non-transmissions, thereby leading to an unbounded
error covariance. As there is a non-zero probability of visit-
ing this state, the expected error covariance will also become
unbounded, contradicting (12).
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Now fix such a policy satisfying (12). Call a sequence of
transmission decisions ν  {ν0, ν1, . . . } admissible for the pol-
icy if there exists a sequence {γ0, γ1, . . . , γe,0, γe,1, . . . } which
generates it. Let ν1:k denote the subsequence {ν0, ν1, . . . , νk}.
We will show that 1K
∑K
k=1 E[Ie,k|ν1:k] is lower bounded away
from zero for any admissible sequence ν and all sufficiently
large K, thus proving the theorem.
Fix a K > κmax and an admissible sequence ν. Let K′ denote
the last time over the horizon K when a transmission attempt
occurred. Then K − K′ < κmax, and K′/K > 1 − κmax/K is




































E[Ie,k|ν1:k, γe,K′ = 1]
Now consider the term 1K′
∑K′
k=1 E[Ie,k|ν1:k, γe,K′ = 1]. Within
this time period K′, there could be a number of time instances k
where γe,k = 1. Denote the random durations between success-
ful eavesdroppings by N1, N2, . . . , Nτ(K′), where the random
variable τ(K′) counts the total number of successful eaves-
droppings within the time period K′ (since γe,K′ = 1, we have










































E[Ie,k|ν1:k] > peL  ̃L
for all sufficiently large K.
In [9] (see also [8], [10], [11]) it was shown that for
unstable systems, one could always find transmission poli-
cies which can keep the expected estimation error covariance
bounded, while the expected eavesdropper covariance became
unbounded. By contrast, Theorem 2 shows that there are
no transmission policies in V which can drive the expected
information revealed to the eavesdropper to zero (including
the policies studied in [9]). The two measures of security,
namely E[Pk|k] investigated in [9], and E[Ie,k] considered
in the current work, therefore appear to be fundamentally
different.
IV. OPTIMAL TRANSMISSION SCHEDULING
In order to illustrate numerically the results of Section III,
we will compare our bounds with the best achievable trade-off
between the expected error covariance at the remote estimator
and the expected information revealed to the eavesdropper.
We thus consider in this section the optimal scheduling of
transmissions, in order to minimize a linear combination of
the expected error covariance and the expected information
revealed. We will consider both cases where the eavesdropper
error covariance is either known or unknown to the remote
estimator.
A. Eavesdropper Error Covariance Known at Remote
Estimator
In this case the decisions νk can depend on both Pk−1|k−1

















β(νkptrP̄ + (1 − νkp)trf (Pk−1|k−1))
+ (1 − β)νkpe
(1
2





where β ∈ (0, 1) is a design parameter. Larger values of β
will place more importance on keeping E[Pk|k] small, while
smaller values of β will place more importance on keeping
E[Ie,k] small. When A is unstable, E[Pk|k] can be kept bounded
if and only if (see [9])
p > 1 − 1|λmax(A)|2 . (14)
Furthermore, by Theorem 1, the expected information revealed
is upper bounded for all pe. Thus there exist policies for
problem (13) with bounded cost under condition (14).
Numerical solutions to problem (13) can be found using,
e.g., the relative value iteration algorithm [22, p. 431]. Note
that the number of possible values of (Pk|k, Pe,k|k) is infinite.
Thus in practice the state space will need to be truncated for
numerical solution. Define the finite set SN ⊆ S by
SN  {P̄, f (P̄), . . . , f N(P̄)}, (15)
which includes the values of all error covariances with up to
N successive packet drops or non-transmissions. Then one can
run the relative value iteration algorithm over the finite state
space SN × SN (of cardinality (N + 1)2)), and compare the
solutions obtained as N increases to determine an appropriate
value for N [23].
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B. Eavesdropper Error Covariance Unknown at
Remote Estimator
In order to construct Pe,k|k at the remote estimator as in
Section IV-A, the process {γe,k} for the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel needs to be known, which in practice may be difficult
to achieve. Here we consider the situation where the remote
estimator knows only the probability of successful eavesdrop-
ping pe and not the actual realizations γe,k. Thus the transmit
decisions νk can only depend on Pk−1|k−1 and our beliefs of
Pe,k−1|k−1 constructed from knowledge of previous νk’s.









































e . . .
]
, ν = 0[
pe (1 − pe)π(0)e (1 − pe)π(1)e . . .
]
, ν = 1
we can obtain the recursive relationship
πe,k+1 = (πe,k, νk+1).










β(νkptrP̄ + (1 − νkp)trf (Pk−1|k−1))












where β ∈ (0, 1). Problem (13) can be solved by using the
relative value iteration algorithm on the reformulation of this
partially observed problem into a fully observed one (a tech-
nique described in [22, p. 252]), together with truncation of
the belief vector (16).
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES






, C = [ 1 1 ], Q = I, R = 1.







We consider the performance obtained by solving the infi-
nite horizon problems (13) and (17) as β is varied, both when
the eavesdropper error covariance is known and unknown. We
use p = 0.6 and pe = 0.8. In numerical solutions we use
the truncated set SN from (15) with N = 10. Fig. 2 plots
the trace of the expected error covariance trE[Pk|k] vs. the
expected information E[Ie,k] revealed to the eavesdropper, with
Fig. 2. Expected error covariance at estimator vs expected information
revealed to eavesdropper.
trE[Pk|k] and E[Ie,k] obtained by taking the time average of
a single Monte Carlo run of length 1000000. The upper and
lower bounds U and ̃L from Theorems 1 and 2 are also
shown. We observe a tradeoff between trE[Pk|k] and E[Ie,k].
Furthermore, as predicted by our result in Theorem 2, the
expected information revealed to the eavesdropper is always
lower bounded away from zero.
VI. CONCLUSION
Remote estimation in the presence of eavesdroppers has
been recently studied from the viewpoint of keeping the esti-
mation error covariance at the eavesdropper large. In this note,
we have considered an alternative notion of security based on
the amount of information revealed to the eavesdropper, and
bounds on the information revealed have been derived. Our
main result shows that for the class of policies considered,
if one wishes to keep the expected error covariance bounded,
then one must unavoidably reveal a non-zero expected amount
of information to the eavesdropper.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We will show that g(N) − g(N + 1) ≥ 0,∀N ∈ N. We have
g(N) − g(N + 1)
= (N + 1) log det f
N(P̄) − N log det f N+1(P̄) − log det P̄
2N(N + 1)
and so it suffices to show that
log
(det f N(P̄))N+1
(det f N+1(P̄))N det P̄
≥ 0
We now note the following identity [24, Th. 18.1.1], which is
also known as the matrix determinant lemma:
det(R + STU) = det(T−1 + UR−1S) det(R) det(T),
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which holds provided the square matrices R and T are
invertible. By making repeated use of this identity, we have
log
(det f N(P̄))N+1
(det f N+1(P̄))N det P̄
= log (det f
N(P̄))N+1
(det(Af N(P̄)AT + Q))N det P̄
= log det f
N(P̄)
(det((f N(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A) det Q)N det P̄
= log
( ∏N
n=1 det((f N−n(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A)
)
det P̄(det Q)N
(det((f N(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A) det Q)N det P̄
= log
∏N
n=1 det((f N−n(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A)
(det((f N(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A))N
From the ordering (8), we have that
(f N−n(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A ≥ (f N(P̄))−1 + ATQ−1A
for n = 1, . . . , N, and the result then follows.
APPENDIX B



























NAN) = σ 2max(AN) ≥ |λmax(AN)|2 = |λmax(A)|2N
where the inequality follows from, e.g., [25, p. 347]. By
Weyl’s Theorem, the largest eigenvalue of λmin(P̄)ANAN +Q
will be strictly greater than λmin(P̄)|λmax(A)|2N , and the
remaining eigenvalues of λmin(P̄)ANAN + Q will be larger



































− log det P̄
]
.
Let N′ be sufficiently large that
g(N′) > log(|λmax(A)|)  L,
Then we have
g(N) > L (18)
for all N ≥ N′. By making use of Lemma 1, (18) will also
hold for all N ≤ N′, and hence (18) holds for all n ∈ N.
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